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The practlcloner of the science of inventory management
will soon note that I have successfully avoided any mention of
several concepts vital to that science. Some of these Include
such fundamentals as safety 11ml tSf shortage costs, supply
effectiveness, and military essentiality. Their Importance Is
definitely recognized? however, out of a profound respect for the
breadth and depth of the problems associated with each of those
concepts, I have left them for the contemplation of future
students. Each would be an area where research would be fruitful,
I am sure. I have Intentionally limited the scope of this paper,
motivated by the time limitations Imposed by the other require-
ments of the academic curriculum In which I am enrolled, to
dealing with that part of Inventory sometimes referred to as the
"operating level of supply." This Is the part over and above the
safety level and Is the part susceptible to replenishment through
the use of economic order quantity formulae.
I am grateful for the suggestions of my contemporaries,
for the patience of my family, for the Information furnished by
the officers and civilian employees of the Bureau of Supplies and
Acco\mts, and for the others v:ho have given so freely of their
time. I am much Indebted to the Oomm^inding Officer of the Ships
ill

Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, and especially
to Lieutenant Commander 0, W'oodford Rixey, Jr*, Supply Corps,
U, S, Navy, for the sample data included in Chapter III concerning
the analysis of the total annual costs of Inventory management
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The Soonomics of Inventory Manag^ement
The Department of Defense requires that the replenishment
of stook at secondary activities of the various distribution
systems be based on "economic considerations, Item characteristics)
and performance objectives.' Replenishment of stock items based
on economic considerations requires the use of formulae in which
the quantities to be ordered and the reorder points are functions
of the several costs Incurred in the management of inventories.
These formulae are in use for segments of the Kavy supply system
and are similar to those which are generally accepted and in use
today in Industry. The reorder quantities which are computed with
the formulae are sometimes called "economic order quantities,"
"economic purchasing quantities," or even "economic buy quantities,
These terms will be used Interchangeably throughout this paper,
especially in quoting from the authorities used for reference
purposes. There also are a number of names given to the rules
3-Department of Defense Instruction 4140.11 of 24 June 1958,

2themselves. Some of these are "mathematical decision rules »"
or "scientific decision rules," and in some of the cases,
"E, 0, Q." (economic order quantity).
The mathematical derivation of the formulae would be
redundant here. If the reader is interested, there are several
authorities available on the subject in which the derivation is
included.^
It is postulated that the most economical method of
managing inventories would result when the costs associated with
ordering and the costs associated with holding the material in
store were at a minimum. These costs are more Inclusive than
sometimes realized. As defined by the Stanford Research Institute!
The costs associated with holding an item in
storage Include not only the physical holding costs
(TTarehousing, etc.), but the Interest cost of money
financing the material, and the obsolescence risk
rate. The costs of ordering represents the additional
cost that would be incurred (or could be saved) by
placing (or not placing) one order*
iThe reader is referred to T. M. Whltten, Theory of
Inventory I-lana^ement . 2nd Ed., (Princeton: Princeton University
fress. 1958)? The Jlconomio Ordpr Quantlty«>-Sclentlflc Inventory
Management Simplified . Sui^erlntendent of Documents. tJ. S. Govt.
Printing Office, Wash. D. C. {^5^)i 1. Everet vJelch, Tested
Scientific Inventory Oontrol . (Greenwich, Connecticut j Management
Publishing Corporation, February, 1958); John P. Magee, "Guides to
Inventory Policy I: Functions and Lot Sizes," Harvard Business
Review . Jan-Peb. 1956, pp. 49-60; or Robert G. Brown. StatisticaijL,
Porecastiy. for Inventory Control . (Kew York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1959).
2Stanford Research Institute, Advanced Stock Control
Procedures. Electronics Supply Office . A report prepared for the
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Navy Department, Ifashington, D.O*
(Menlo Park. California: Stanford Research Institute, January,
1959), P. 48.

The total annual costs of ordering and holding the
operating level o£ supply (the amount in excess of the stook held
for insurance against stook-outs) can be expressed mathematically
by the formula:
TAG =
.J^ Q + ^__^
op Q ° -f- PI
where
:
fAO = the total annual costs of buying and holding
op
the amounts purchased.
A = the 3-nnual demand
Q = the "buy" quantity
= order cost per order
A^ = the cost of ordering the annual demand
and:
P = the unit price of the item
I = the holding cost rate.-^
£pl = the annual cost of holding material in store.
The holding cost rate (I) is sometimes incorrectly
called the interest rate; however, as noted above the holding
cost rite includes the sum of the obsolescence risk rate, the
costs of physical storage, and the interest rate pertaining to
vN } utility of funds which, if they were not used to finance the
..iTentory would be available for other purposes. This might be
dbown symbolically as:I=o+s+i.

4Th« eooaomlo order quantity (or aoonomlo "buy" quantity)
is oomputed through expressing a relationship between the oosts
associated with holding material in storage and the costs
associated with placing orders. Symbolically the economic order




Q s the economic order quantity
A =: the annual demand in units
= the cost to order for each order
P = the unit price of the item, and
1 3 the holding cost rate.
This relationship is expressed graphically in Figure 1.
Prom this, it can be seen that ordering costs decrease whenever
larger quantities are ordered since it will be necessary to place
orders less frequently. On the other hand, as the quantity
ordered in each purchase increases, inventories are increased;
consequently the costs to hold the inventories in store increases.
Prom Figure 1, it can be noted also that the minimum total annual
costs would result if a quantity of 500 of the item were ordered;

5however, if a qiiantlty of 400 or 600 were ordered costs would not
Increase significantly. This is because, at the points near the
mininium total cost point, one of the costs involved decreases
about as iirach as the other increases* This is one of the virtues
of using the economic order formula. The last point to mention
in connection with Figure 1 is whenever a large error is made in
the computation of economic order quantities, total annual costs
Increase significantly. This is especially true if the quantities
are reduced* The lower segment of the total cost curve can be
seen to rise more rapidly.
In finding the most economical method of managing our
inventories, the use of mathematical formula is necessary; in
view of the resentment sometimes engendered whenever mathematical
formulae are Introduced, this is unfortunate. However, the
concept is basic; the optimum (least cost) method of managing
our Inventories is a most desirable goal. If we are unable to
attain that goal, at least we should select the best alternative
available, a "better" (less costly) method. This is the same
concept of economic analysis currently used in the selection of
alternatives by the Secretary of Defense:
To help predict the consequences of alternative
policies and practices, we may use models on paper,
models in our heads, models in the form of games, or
simulation laboratories to represent the functioning
of logistics systems. Ifi any event, the alternatives
should be considered in terms of economic criterion .
"We should loolc p.t these choices as problems of
maximization in the face of constraints or, in less
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technical language, as problems of getting the
greatest capability from our limited resources*
Again, the way of looking at these problems is
what we wish to stress most of all. In addition,
quantitative analysis • « • can often help us reach
better decisions about these issues in logistics."^
With the development of these scientific decision rules.
It is theoretically possible to compute the most eoonomioal
quantities to be ordered simply by substituting the proper values
for the costs involved in the formula and solving for Q, the
fconomio order quantity* It is in the substitution of the proper
iralues for the costs involved precisely where the difficulties
lie. First, they are difficult to determine because they are so
ephemeral, A less obvious difficulty arises from the fact that
OXLly the variable elements of these costs are significant to the
computation and, to determine the variable elements, it is
necessary to agree on an appropriate time frame of reference.
What may be true in the long run may not be true, for example,
from the annual budget point of view.
It Is exactly this point which will be considered in some
detail in the next chapter. It is recognized that at best the
discussion can only point to an approach to the problems involved,
^Charles J, Hitch and Roland K, McKean, The Boonomics o^
Defense in the Nuclear Ag:e ( Cambridge s Harvard TJniverslty i'ress
,
I960), p, 281. (Bmphasis mine )
•

8The solution of the problems involved in the determination of
these costs has been the object of many years* effort by talented
organizations, Sven so, indications are that much remains to be
done. The third chapter deals with two of the more current
approaches to "fit" the formula to budgetary constraints, and
recommendations with regard to these efforts.
In part, some of the discussion Included will be
applicable to the formula for determining the reorder point
("when" to order as opposed to "how much," which is the basis for
the material in this paper). However, consideration of reorder
points would involve a discussion of shortage costs (the price
we pay for not having an item in stock where and when it is
required), military essentiality (how important an item is to th«
mission of the ship), and supply effectiveness. Bach of these
concepts is important and is commended to future students as
fruitful areas of research, especially as they relate to the
funding of inventories. They are omitted only because of the
additional time which would be required for their special
considerations*
Although it is obvious to those trained In the science of
Inventory management, it should be recognized by all that the use
of economic order quantity and variable safety limit formulae is
based on the premise that any variation involved is of a random
nature. This would include variation in usage and variation in

9production (procurement) lead-time. If the requirement for an
Item is based on other than "normal" (including only random
rariatlon) demand, such as, for example, a "Cuban crisis," where
all available ghips were alerted and replenished iidth all items
to endurance levels, then the scientific supply decision rules
are not applicable. Many a supply officer has found himself in
the position of being out of stock, for example, of enlisted
men's neckerchiefs in his clothing store within a few minutes
after the word "leaked out" that the new commanding officer was
a "bear" on rolled neckerchiefs (rendering the well-creased
neckerchiefs in the hands of the crew "obsolete"). Whereas the
store normally sold from 20 to 30 a month on which the "normal"
stock of 90 was based, suddenly 850 new ones were needed. It Is
Important to recognize this point. If the demand for an item is
based on other than random demand, the techniques involved in the
aconomic analysis of military Inventories are not applicable.
The Navy is faced with a twofold objective of military readiness
and economical operation. These ob;Jectlves, in a sense, are not
oompatible In that to increase the effectiveness of one reduces
the effectiveness of the other. It can be argued that, if the
lavy must be ready to meet whatever "crisis" arises, then the
•eonomic decision rules should not be utilized. However, for
large segments of the Navy's inventory, the variation in demand
approaches randomness to a degree that these rules have reduced
inventory management costs without significantly detracting from
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allltary readiness. In a study of these rules for a ftoall
gtgment of the inventory controlled by the Kaval Supply Center,
San Diego, the following was concluded
I
The new policy will laalce possible substantial
improvements in supply system costs and effectiveness.
. .
A conservative expectation is that the new
policies will •oermit a permanent reduction in inventory
investment of |lOO,000 (approximately 30 percent), a
reduction in the number of reorders from over 11,000
to slightly under 4,000 (approximately 65 percent), as
well as a significant reduction In the number of
shortages (when compared with present procedures).-'"
One of the approaches to obtain efficiency in military decisions
as proposed by now Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Charles J. Hitch is by
Increased recognition and awareness that military
decisions, whether they specifically involve budgetary
allocations or not, are in one of their important
aspects economic decisions; and that unless the right
questions are aslced, the appropriate alternatives
selected for comparison, and an economic criterion
used for choosing the most efficient, military power
and national security will suffer.^
!Phe use of mathematical supply decision rules has
«igniflcant implications* If they are used correctly, then the
nanageaent of military inventories can be perfonaed more
^Hobert p. Mcintosh, Improvement of Local Sur>pl7 Decision
Rules at H* Sf 0». San Dief^o . A report prepared for the Bureau of
Supplies and Accounts, i*avy Department, Washington, D. 0.
Prepared by the Planning Research Corporation, Report PRO R-132
(Los Angeles? Planning Research Corporation, 1 October 1959 )»
p. 25.
^Hitch and MoKean, op. clt .. p. 107.
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economically without impairing mllitaj:^' readiness. If they are
ue«d incorrectly, or when they are not applicable, unnecessary
costs may be incurred. But, more important, the danger exists
that while we usay manage oixr Inventories more economically, we
do so only at the cost of sacrificing military readiness to a
degree that is unrecognized In inventory management decisions.

CHAPTER II
fHE IJESOHIPTIOH OF OOST PARAMSTMS
By far the most difficult pro'blein Involved In the use of
economic order quantity formula Is the determination of the cost
parameters. Some of the parameters, which on the surface seem
relatively easy to determine, are In fact complicated by the many
factors Involved* For example, the annual demand must be forecast
In terms of Its ret>lenlshable (recurring) and Its nonreplenlshable
(one-time requirement) nature* Frequently this is difficult to
determine based on the records available at the point where
replenishment quantities are being computed* It is necessary to
treat nonreplenlshable demand as known (planned) requirements?
only the replenishable demand Is subject to random variation*
Many techniques liave been devised to assist in forecasting annual
replenishable demand* Many articles have been prepared with
respect to forecasting* Random variation in demand can be
predicted within set limits of confidence on the basis of
probability formula* The use of past demand should not be
deprecated as a method, for it very often Is the best estimate of




of the eoonprnlo order quantity Is a function of predicted demand-«»
not past history. Knoxm "J" factors which would affect the future
recurring demand for an item raust be made a part of the forecast.
0&# technique used to assist in the determination of demand trends
1b the exponential smoothing technique which weights demand by
giving more Importance to recent developments. Another is the
use of tracking signals to detect demand surges. Continued
development of these techniques Is encouraged to improve the
TBlldlty of demand forecasts. After all, the decision rules are
only Important in that they affect future costs; these costs are
a function of the predicted demand.
The problem of ascertaining the imit price parameter is
not without difficulties. It is the unit price of the quantity
to be ordered which is pertinent. At the time the decision Is
ade to replenish this may not be known. Often it depends on the
quantity to be ordered, especially If large quantities are
Involved. The cost of transportation is sometimes Included in
the price of the materials; at other times it is not.
"While both the annual demand and the unit price parameters
present some very important problems in computing the economic
order quantities because of their relative simplicity as opposed
to the others Involved, most of the disoussion will be centered
on the ordering costs and the costs of holding material in store.
One of the difficulties in determining these costs stems from the
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fact that the present method of accounting for these costs does
not facilitate segregation In the manner required. The second
difficulty Is, only the variable elements of the costs Incurred
are Involved in a given computation. However, what may be a fixed
cost in processing the next order, such as the additional
purchasing clerk's salary, may, when viewed from the perspective
of the annual budget, be a variable cost (the clerk could be
released If enough orders were eliminated)! in the long run, every
cost is a variable cost.
Ordering costs Increase, generally, as the number of
orders increase. These costs include the salaries of the
purohasins personnel, telephone bills, correspondence, telegrams,
filing, processing of receipt documents, the cost of paying bills
»
of unloading faoilltiesi transportation, drayage, Inspection,
receiving and initial warehousing. Strictly speaking, it should
also Include the manufacturer's setup costs; however, these costs
are rarely known* They can be identified in any situation where
intracompany shipments are made, such as in the military, ^fhen a
requisition is placed on another depot, the additional costs
Incurred (by the shipping depot) include processing the incoming
requisition, picking, packaging and shipping the item. It should
be recognized that, while Intramllltary requisitioning procedures
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Bay be less costly than the cost of originating a p\irchase orfier
to purchase from comaerQlal sources, the double handling of the
paperwork and material involved by the military more than offsets
such economies*
It is difficult to determine the costs of ordering simply
because of the manner In \^lch costs are "hidden" in the
appropriation structure and the "spillover" which results when
one resource is committed to more than one function. For example,
the Kavy officer who has purchasing as one of the functions for
vhich he is responsible Is paid from the appropriation, Military
Personnel, Kavy. The first problem would be to allocate the
Tariable portion of his pay and allowances—plus the other expensee
Involved in supporting lilm as a Haval officer—to the purchasing
function. If his time could be apportioned, this would be a
reasonable basis. In the very short run, of course, no variable
alement would be Involved; all costs would be fixed. In the very
long riJin, part of his time could be allocated as a variable cost.
In a budget year concept, only a part of the long-run costs
should be so allocated on the premise that the time of military
officers involved in purchasing could be reduced if a sufficient
number of purclms© orders could be eliminated. Further
complications arise in that some of the costs in supporting the
military officer are paid from appropriations other than the
appropriation laiitary Personnel, Navy.

16
By far tlie greatest portion of the ordering costs are
paid from the appropriation, Operations and Maintenance, Navy*
This includes the salaries of personnel and expenses of the
ordering office, the salaries and expenses of the receiving
personnel at the receiving activity, as well as the shipping
costs of shipping activities when they can be so identified, A
part of the cost of ordering may be paid for by the appropriation
financing the material purchased* If shipping costs are added
to the price of the material, the using activity pays the cost.
When laaterial is accepted at the contractor's plant, or is shipped
between military activities, then the service-^rlde supply part
of the appropriation pays the additional costs. The cost of
construction of office, receiving, and slilpping facilities is
Included in the appropriation. Military Construction, Mvy. Some
of the costs, such as the Interest on the funds which finance
the ordering costs, never appear in the Havy appropriation
structure.
It can be seen from the above that, although some effort
has been expended in determining the variable costs of ordering
t
the collection of these costs is difficult. Also, the variable
portion of the costs Increases as the time-frame is extended.
This has resulted in considerable confusion in the implementation
of the economic order quantity formulae. Several widely divergent
estimates of the cost to order have been formulated. Most often
the tendency is to underestimate the ordering costs as reported
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In the Production Handbook s
One company was surprised to find its cost of
procurement per order was i21.11« A rule-of-thumb
figure by other companies is in the- neighborhood of
#8»00 to ^"^12. 00 per purchase order.^
The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts recommended that a
value of $45tOO per order be used by the Stanford Research
Institute in its study of Advanced S]^pply DeplrS^lon Rules for the
|i;L ,^ctrQnic3 Supply Of^ipe In 1959*^ The Planning Research
Corporation in its analysis of local supply decision rules at the
Mval Supply Center, San Diego used an order cost of ^5*40 per
order. ^ It would appear the latter lower estimate was based on
the fact that orders were placed for a relatively small segment
of Material involved in the study | also that relatively small
orders would be issued for the material involved* One of the
larger inventory control points has recognized the increasing
complexity of contracting for larger dollar volume and has
estimated the cost of large orders (over ^2,500) as about ^725»
whereas the cost of small orders (under C*2»500) was estimated at
about ^75 for the centralized proctiring agency, ^fhen the Bureau
^Gordon B. Oarson, (ed.), Production Handbook . (Second
Company, 19r'
"
Edition; New Torkt The Ronald Press 59), pp. 4-55
•
^Stanford Research Institute
Mcintosh, loo, cit .. p. 12.
Stanf , ?.oo. cit *. p. 22,
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Of Supplies and Accounts stock tables were issued originally for
certain categories of locally controlled material, the tables
were based on an estimated cost to order of $10,00 per order.
In a study of the ordering costs of one of the Kavy*s inventory
managers, the Ships Parts Control Center, Mechaniosburg,
Pennsylvania, line item order costs were determined to be ^24,08
for small purchase orders, -Hl«89 for negotiated contracts, and
|55«54 for advertised contracts. It is noted, however, that
ordering costs for this estimate were relatively narrowly defined
as only those costs incurred at Ship's Parts Control Center.^
That the estimates which have been cited are so widely
divergent of necessity, points up the fact that they have been
computed on differing ground rules* In the report of Dunlap and
Associates, Inc., some of the problems involved are noted
j
First, any estimates of the parameters required must
be wholly arbitrary because the underlying theory is not
stated in operational terms. The theory does not define
"order cost and "holding cost" parameters. There is no
way of telling what costs are properly chargeable to
these parameters, or where they begin or end, or whether
they are long-run or short-run marginal costs. Such
questions o&xi, be answered only by making arbitrary
assumptions.^
le Advanced Logistics Research Division, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts (Stanford, Connecticut: Dunlap and Associates, Inc.,
31 July 1961), p. T2.
%bid . . p, 70.
t
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To resolve the dilemma, for purposes of their study, the
following was rationalized:
Since the theory underlying the economic buy
formula in use at SPOC has not been stated in
operational terms, it Is impossible to measure the
"order cost" in a way which can really be justified
in terras of the theory* The most that can be done is
to make some arbitrary or intuitive operational
definition of the term "order cost" and to meas\xre it
accordingly*-^
Although there are difficulties involved in ihe
determination of variable (short-run) costs, it by no means
follows that no decisions shoxild be taken. It is more difficult
to estimate variable elements for short-run costs than for long-run
costs. It seems reasonable that if the procurement operation were
to be envisioned as one which would endxire for a number of years,
that as many of the costs as possible should be considered as
variable costs in the determination of cost parameters. Hot only
would this reduce the complexity of cost analysis, but would
provide for a more efficient long-run procurement effort. To view
the ooflts always in terms of annual budgets would deny the long-run
advantages of using economic order quantity formulae.
Obviously, there must be some agreement as to some time-
frame of reference for the estimation of the variable elements of
the costs involved. Further, if the estimates indicate that the




value of a oost parameter should be changed, these changes should
be Implemented on a progressive "basis, since any revision of
values will tend to, in the transient year(s), affect other cost
parameters as well* Oost parameters must be studied in terms of
the time, location, and other constraints Involved and are by no
means a one-time determination. In fact, the revision of a cost
parameter will affect future determinations of its otfn value.
However, it is concluded that we are not in a position to make
sound inventory management decisions which will select
economically attractive alternatives unless we know ^at our costt
really are.
the way is not easy* Problems involving the same kind
of determinations are faced in connection with the maximization
of cost effectiveness in decisions at top governmental levels.
Indeed, if anything, the problems there are even more difficult.
Particular attention had to be given to the
development of meaningful cost/effectiveness data
on alternative weapons systems. Because of the long
life cycle of major weapons systems, their costs must
be projected over years-«-ideally over their entire
life span. • * « Since such long term projections
are verj difficult irith any degree of precision, we
fixed on a five year period, ^ich is short enough
to make possible reasonably accurate estimates and
long enough to provide a good approximation of the
full oost.
Additionally we needed to know, not only the
one-time costs for development, procurement and
construction of facilities, but also the recurring
annual operating costs .-^
^Charles J. Hitch, "Management of the Defense Dollar,"
^^aw Budf!:et Dig^est* PjLgoal Year 1963. (Washingtonj Office of the
Jomptroller, 'Bavj Department, 1962), p. 22.
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The Holding Oost Rate
The holdia.5 cost rats is possibly the most difficult cost
parameter to determine. This is difficult not only because of the
lack of accounting data relative to the variable cost elements,
but also because of the three types of costs involved. The three
costs included in the holding oost rate are the costs of physical
storage, the obsolescence risk rate, and the interest rate.
The costs of physical storage include warehousing, heat,
IL^ht, rent, refrigeration, deaumidification, Janitor service,
security, preservation, and the cost of physical inventories. When
long-run costs are considered within the variable portions, there
are further probleais of allocating costs of materials handling
equipment, v^^arehouse bins, and the other fixed assets vrhich are
eventually required to handle additional material. Of the estimate{J
costs of holding inventories, these costs are more easily computed
in a long-run analysis. They become increasingly difficult when
computed on an annual basis. Two of the economic costs of holding
inventories which are difficult to justify when military
Inventories are considered are insurance costs and the loss of
taxes.
Iflfhile the Navy does not pay for insurance, the fact is
that it does sustain losses for which a prudent businessman would
obtain insurance. This is not to say the Navy is in error by not
obtaining insurance; this cost is included as a recognition of the
losses sustained which are normally insurable. The loss of taxes

22
is even more difficult to justify, hov^^ever. The cost of taxes
would be recognized by a baslnessman. If tue laaterlal In store
for the government were not required, and these resources could be
diverted to industrial uses, then the government would be able to
realize a return from taxation. This return is lost because the
government has diverted these resources to public use. This return
is lost to the government and, in this sense, is an "economic cost"
of holding the material by the government.
The obsolescence risk rate is measured by a number of
costs. It may take several forms, including (1) outright spoilage
after a mors or less fixed period; or (2) rlak that a particular
unit of stock will become unsalable for technological reasons.
Some items in the supply system have a definite shelf life, such
as photO:^raphic paper, rubber goods, or fresh produce. Also in
military Inventories it 13 often necessary to store items under
other than ideal storage conditions. The humidity in one area,
extreme cold in another, or necessity for outside storage in
another, all may Increase spoilage and deterioration. The
Obsolescence of material in store, particularly of repair parts,
is probably one of the most significant elements of the cost of
holding material in military inventories.
Because of changes in technology and operating concepts,
items in the system are being constantly replaced by more advanced
designs. Althougn those items having a replenishable demand, and \
therefor susceptible to scientific supply decision rules, are less''.
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affected than others, this has increased la Importance with recent
technolo.jslcal developments. 'Cnole new weapons 97s terns are being
made obsolescent, althoa^^h, in general, the costs "sunk" In the
old weapons systems are considered before they are paased out.
The importance of this element is stressed simply because it is so
often underestimated. As an example, in the budget presentation
of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts with respect to the
apportionment of the Naval Stock Fund allotment of the Ships Parts
Control Center at Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, it was estimated
that 13 and 24 percent of the repair parts originally provisioned
for nQ\-i equipments for the fiscal years 1962 and 1965, respectively,
would become obsolete without ever having been used.^
Possibly the most difficult of the costs to consider is
the interest rate to be u^ed in the computation of inventory
requiremsnta. The Department of Defense Instruction 4140,11
specifies that an interest rate of four percent will be ur;ed for
inventory management purposes, based on the concept that the U, 3,
Sovernment pays about that rate^ therefore, this is one of the
factors used in determining the holding cost rate. However, at
such times as funds are restricted on a temporary basis, a higher
rate of interest might be Justified by the inventory manager or the
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Navy 3 took Fund. Fiscal
year 1963 Reapportionment and Fiscal Year 1964 3ud,;';;et .Sstimate s





Defense Department, on the pretext taat if the money were not
used to finance inventories, it might be used elsewhere mora
productively, vihen the use of funds is delayed, that is, when
the funds are used elsewhere with the understanding that a larger
amount vfill be made available at a later date, and a higher
Interest rate is used, the manager is said to be expressing his
"time-preference rate."
rime-preference rates express one element of choice
in decision rules for a complex system. It is the
choice of one from a set of alternative time patterns
of benefits and costs expected in successive fut'ure
periods. Where there are a number of such patterns
or distributions over time that are all feasible, a
common vmy to proceed i:? to consider only that subset
w lere the importance of benefits (such as meeting
demand) is assumed to decline either linearly or
exponentially (analagoun to simple or compound
discounting) in successive future years. Each alternative
pattern within thin subset can then be characterized by
its rate of decline.-''
One interestinj^ study was made by the Plannines Researci Oorporation
in which the thesis was advanced that if it were unnecessary for
the f^overnmsnt to hold inventory, the funds used to finance the
inventory could be used for induntrial purposes; hence the
"interest" rate which is comparable is the average rate of return
Havy Department, Advanced Logistics Research Division,
Bureau of 3upplies and Accounts, What is Time Preference Rate?
(Washington, D, 0.: May, I960), p. lb.
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Oil laves tmeat In the American eoonomy.^
Follo'f/iUo this thesis, in order to determine the average
yearly rate of return, earnings for 72 industrial corporations
and the yearly asset values (leaa oash and receivables) were
assrs^ated. The total ten-year earninijs (19^9-1953) were divided
by the sum of the year-end asset values to determine the average
yearly rate of return. The companies included manufacturing,
electric and natural ^jas utilities, telephone commanications, and
railroads. The results are tabulated as follows;
Industrial Sector Physical Assets Average Annual







"^J. A. Stockfisch, the Interest Post of Holdin>a; iillitary
Inventory . A report prepared for the Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Navy Department, Washin-^ton, B. 0. (Los Angeles:
Plaanin^i Research Oorporation, PRO a-156, 5 May I960), p. 4.
2
The totals shown are those which are included in the repor
(page 11), although they are incorrect. The error arises in that,
in the report, utilities were broken down into electric and
natural ^^ag. The subtotals for utilities w-ere added in a second
time, hence the total? shown are overstated by 17.8 in 1949 and







Whan percentage weights are applied, based on the percentage of
each sector of the economy, the overall rate of return generated
by investment in physical assets turns out to be 16,5 percent
•
There are a number of points that might be made which
would reflect on the validity of this analysis. Some of these
Include the fact that only a relatively few of the larger
corporations were used as a basis for the analysis. The smaller
companies, banlcrupt corporations, and the entrepreneurs are not
represented. To include the noncorporate sector in the calculation
would lovrer the rate of return somewhat, although not much since
the larger sector, in terms of assets committed, is the corporate
sphere. The "boolc value" of assets, which was used as a base for
the computations, also does not accurately reflect their true
economic value because of the deflated value of the dollar and the
method of depreciating "old" assets. To verify the percentage of
return on investment, a second method was utilized. The market
value of outstanding securities of the 72 companies was used to
value their corporation's assets as measured by the market. The
market value was then divided into the income which acciMied to
these security holders. Several adjustments were necessary to
refine the results attained. The results of the survey were as
follows
:
^Ibid .. p. 14.
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Average Aiinual Market Avera^^e Yearly Income Hate of
yalue of .issets (Millions ) Before Taxes (Millions) Return
561,821.3 18,604.1 13.9.^
Ihis is comparable to the 19.6;^ rate of return derived
from the first method* The first method deducted cash, near-casii,
and receivables, on the grounds that tliey were nonproduoti'/e in
the social sense and to include them -*f0uld have been double
counting, whereas the second method included them. If all assets
had oeen used in the first method, the percent rate of return also
ifould have been 13«9^» identical to the rate of return obtained
by the second method.
It is a matter of conjecture to consider that the next
|60 billion invested in the economy will bring the 3ame rate of
return as did the previous |60 billion. Further, it mast be
observed that the market value of stock can vary overnight without
a significant corresponding reduction in assets. It s-^ould be
another victory for "technlquemanshlp" were one to succumb to the
statistical accuracy portrayed by the above data. But it is
concluded here that the four percent set by the Department of
Defense an the appropriate rate of Interest in the aforementioned
Department of .Defense instruction does not adequately reflect the
rate of return vfhich might be realized if the alternative to
^ Ibid .. p. 13.
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Investmeat in military inventories was investment in industrial
aeaete. Although this alternative is not available insofar as
the individual military inventory manager is concerned, the
alternatives vrhich are available compete for every other defen3e
dollar, and in sum total the rates paid for military inventories
are the same as for missiles or any other expense, total ,j;overn-
a»ant dollars must compete with the alternative uses which might
b« made of that dollar provided it were not collected in taxes.
this is the point of view presented in Chapter III of The E'conomics
of pQiQnse in the Uuolear A^i^e :
What, in a fundamental sense, is the "cost" of a
course of action? It is whatever must be given up in
order to adopt that course, that is, whatever could
otherwise be kept or obtained.-^
rihile it is contended that the four percent figure ia
unreallstically low in determining appropriate cost parameters.
If the 13.9/^ were used as an "interest" rate, then the holding
cost rate ^rould become extremely high when added to an obsolescence
rate and actual rates of storage costs. If a ten percent
Obsolescence rate were applicable and a physical holding rate of
I percent were used, then the holding coat rate would approximate
24.9^,
Hitch and McKean, op. cit .. p. 26.
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With the vaxiablQs Involved in the holding cost rate, It
can be seen that each inventory manager is hard pressed to arrive
at any meaningful rate whioh best relates his experience—and the
experience of the supply system—to his particular range of items.
Some guidance has been provided by industrial concerns which, from
a profit motive, have devoted considerable time and energy to the
study of this problem.
Generally, the total of the holding costs runs from 10
to 20 percent of the value of the Inventory per year. One large
automotive manufacturer with a model obsolescence problem uses
25% per year as his figure,^ One commonly used estimate of the
percentage cost per year of carrying inventory is as follows:
cJtorage facilities , , 2%
Daxes and Insurance, , , , • . . • 1
Material Handling and
Heoord-Keeping ....,,.. 4
Interest on Investment ,»..,, 5
Depreoiation, Obsolescence,
and Shriakage . 5
Total 17,t^




Another iQanufaoturer oomputes costs at 15.75^ to whloh he adds
another oontingenoy factor of 20;sfe. He has reosntly reduced his
oontingency factor to 10;^ and oontemplates even further reduction,^
Beohtel (NAOA Bulletin, vol. 36) states that
"in the American Oyanaaid Company, they made numerous
studies to determine the cost of carrying inventories
and each time came up with a different set of fit;ures.
The reason was that the different sets of inventories
involved different sets of costs-to-carry, since
different types of items require different types of
costs. They found that a range of 12 to 20 percent
of the annual inventory valuation was an appropriate
cost, with the lower standard applying to standard
goods such as bulk acids, alums, fertilizers, etc.,
which did not deteriorate or go out of date".^
Bechtel states that "a recent calculation was made to show the
estimated annual average cost of carrying inventories by U. S.
industry. ... If a 5 percent interest rate were used, it would
increase the carrying cost to 22 percent per year."-^
It would seem then, that the higher rate would be more
applicable to an inventory of items such as ships repair parts
where there is a relatively high obsolesoence risk* In a study
by the Stanford Hesearoh Institute of items controlled by the
Electronics Supply Office, a holding cost rate of 15;'^ was used.







Physical Holding Rate 1^
Interest Rate 4
Obsolescence Rate ,10
lotal Holding Oost Rate 155^^
The Bureau of Supplies and Aooounts, after some study in
the matter, concluded that this area was one in which there was a
need for further study. But in order to comply with department of
Defense directives, stock tables were published in 1959» to be
utilized on a restricted basis for locally controlled material in
whioh reorder quantities were computed using a holding oost rate of
20 percent. Other Bureau of Supplies and Accounts stock tables
have been approved for use, using a holding cost rate of 20 percent,
80 that as of 1 August 1962, approximately twenty percent of the
Uavy inventory, or 250,000 items, are now controlled on this basis.
The 20 percent holding cost rate was used simply as a matter of
expediency; however, to date no further studies are underway which
seek to verify the accuracy of the percentage. Overall, it appears
to be a reasonable compromise, and yet this is the very area in
whioh the inventory managers are subject to criticism in the
justification of their budgets. A'hereas the holding cost rate of
«IMIIMW»MWiW»«—««».«»W«l»»M|M«»l««M».«llMI«»»»M««»»l»«»«llll [ |l|lll» l ml <IIIIIIMMIMWM<»llll»I.IW|>IB|W|WM«l(M««»l»»llilllllll«IIIII [.^»«M»»»«»..««IW|iM»«i.«M»»MI»»«ll«WW««««MMW<«l
•^Stanford Research Institute, loc. cit .
^Alan J. Qradwohl, Technical Description of the Ba3andA
Stock Tablg ?ro>"<ram . A report prepared for the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts, Ifevy Department, Washington, D. 0., Report PRO R-262







20 percent would tend to reduce the Investment in Inventories, as
opposed to the rates whioh would be used if the 4 percent interest
rate were used as recommended by the Department of Defense, budget
analysts have suggested the use of even higher rates, as much as
300,1 in order to reduce investment levels even further,
Unfortunately, while a small increase in the holding rate would
not affect total costs significantly, such a large variation is
very costly. It is difficult to prove that costs are increased,
however, TiThen the true economic order quantity depends on the
accurate evaluation of the cor,t parameters in the first instance.
One not only has difficulty Justifying budgets, but really cannot
Jmow if, in fact, hie budget estimates are truly optimal from a
cost point of view.

OHAPTSR III
ADJUSTING lUVENTORISS TO BUDaST LIMITATIONS
Bud.a;et Ju3tlfloa1ilon
The purpose of the scientific Inveatory decision rules to
reduce the total costs of inventory management to a ainlmuin, would
seea the answer to the budget analyst's prayers; yet the facts are
that insufficient funds have been authorized to permit ordering
the "most aoonomioal" order quantities. Ideally, the Justification
of the inventory manager's budget would follo^'f the procedure of
determining the most economical costs, compute requirements based
on the formula, total the costs of obtaining these requirements,
and budgeting for these funds. Unfortunately, there is consider-
able discussion regarding the accuracy of the cost parameters as has
been suss^s'^s^^ i^ Ohapter II« Then, of course, the costs are
absorbed by various appropriations and this requires review by
more than one budget analyst. It is not uncommon to have one
appropriation cut on the assumption that it will be funded from
another only to have the second budget analyst fall to consider the
increase proper in the appropriation which he reviews. If the Havy




eoonomic order quantity formula, there must be a oorrelatioa of
effort to balance funds properly used to finance the purchase of
the material (I.e., the Navy Stock ij^md) and the funds ueed to
finance inventory operations (I.e., Operations and Maintenance,
Navy). In describing this phenomenon, Department of Defense
Qomptroller Hitoh points out?
• , cheap parts can economically be stocked in
greater number and quantity at base level than has
been the case under Air Force regulations. Various
statistics confirm this view. About 25 percent of all
aircraft parts demanded at a base during a month are
not now normally stocked at a base or are not stocked
in sufficient quantities, • . • It is not very hard
to prove that it would be economical for the Air Force
to keep larger stocks of cheap aircraft spares at its
bases and to reorder in larger quantities than in the
past. This need^ not mean an equivalent Increase in Air
Force v^orldwide stocks—far from it—but it does involve
some shift of funds away from depot supply operations.
^
While there are potential savings in the full implementation
of economic order quantity formula, there are transition costs
which must be considered. In the early stages it is necessary to
order the more inexpensive items in larger quantities, temporarily
inoreastn.T; the investment costs. While in full implementation
these increased costs would be offset by reduced stock levels of
the more expensive items, there is a natural "reluctance" to
accept lower inventory levels of these items. However, once this
Is accepted as a more efficient utilization of resources, this
^Hitch and McKean, op. oit .. p. 274.
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should offset sufficiently to reduce inventory investment, Some
of the problems involve the rate of interest established by the
Department of Defense, The interest rate is so low that it has
resulted in a relatively low holding cost rate. This would tend,
In computing economic order quantities, to increase the level of
Investment. Computations thus far have resulted in inventory
levels higher than the budget analysts of the Department of Defense
have been willing to approve.
It is sometimes considered relatively simple in a
revolving fund arrangement (i.e., where the fund is reimbursed by
other appropriations whenever material held in the fund is issued)
to utilize the funds generated for replenishment purposes. This
would be a form of "backdoor spending" which Congressional
appropriation committees find so reprehensible. However, in the
ease of the Havy atoolc Fund, control is maintained over the cash
portion of the fund through the budget by both the allotment and
apportionment procedures, 3ach year the Inventory manager must
estimate his requirements and submit them in budget form to the
Bureau of Supplies and Acooonts, where they are consolidated and
submitted through regular budget procedures similar to the method
used for other budget requests. The requirements of the inventory
manager are based on projected sales (issues), programs which must
be supported, resources on hand, and stockage objectives which are
set forth by the Department of Defense, Currently, for retail
items of the Defense Supply Agency, stock levels authorized for the
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Ifavy are a one and one-half month operatlni^ level (corresponding
to the amount ifhlch is susceptible to replenishment "by economic
order quantity (S.O*Q,) and a one month safety level. For ship
repair parts, the operating level of supply is six months' usage
and the safety level three months* usage. However generous these
levels may seem, there are many items in the inventories of repair
parts which, although provisioned Initially, never generate a
demand vfhlch would justify replenishment on an economic order
quantity oasis. Also, many items are maintained for "insurance"
purposes, whether for mobilization purposes or other contingencies.
These factors present the problem which faces most
Inventory managers. Funds available are inadeqaate for the various
programs supported, to provision new equipment, and to replenish
stocic for those items used. One method used to reduce requirements
1b to increase the interest rate used in the replenishment formula*
This then increases the cost of holding the inventory and thus
reduces the quantities to be purchased. A second method is now
In use in which the cost parameters are not "adjusted." Ihe "buy"
quantities are reduced by an arbitrarily set percentage as
necessary to reduce purchases to the levels permitted )iy available
funds. The effects of these adjustments will be discussed in later
sections, but assumin^j that the cost parameters were valued
correctly, theoretically unnecessary costs will, in the long run,
be incurred in both instances. These costs will not appear in the
Navy Stocic i'und. They will be absorbed primarily by the operations
^Supra




and raaintenanoe appropriation. Some of these costs will never
appear in the accounting records or be identified with inventory-
decisions. The manner in which the costs increase will be
discussed later, but as noted, this is difficult to ascertain with
the dilution of fiscal charges as collected in the accounting
system.
Ad.justment of Post Parameters
When the formula for the computation of the economic order
quantity is considered, it can be seen that relatively large
adjustments in the cost parameters will have little effect on the
quantity to be ordered. In fact, this has been propounded as a
virtue of the formula; exact determination of cost parameters are
not essential to achieve many of the benefits of E.O.Q,^ The
formula is recalled:
f DTPI
With the relationships involved, it really makes no
difference whether the order cost is doubled or the holding cost
rate cut in half; the results are the sajae. Further, since the
order quantity varies proportionately to the square of the parameter^




Involved, it takes a rather substantial adjustment to affeot the
"buy" quantity. For example, inoreasing the holding oost rate
fourfold is necessary to reduce the buy quantity by 50%, If It is
desired to reduce the "buy" quantity the problem resolves into
which of the cost parameters is most susceptible to adjustment and
how muoh of an adjustment should be made.
First, quite arbitrarily, the annual demand or the order
costs might be reduced (A and in the numerator of the fraction).
Ihe same adjustment can be made by increasing the unit price or the
holding cost rate (P and I respectively in the denominator of the
fraction). Two of these parameters are more difficult to adjust
simply because they are more readily computed by reordering
personnel. These include the annual demand, as reported, and the
unit price at which the material is carried. Ordering costs and
holding oost rates, because of the difficulty in computing them,
are more readily adjusted. Since it makes no difference whether
the orderin^^ costs or the holding cost rate is adjusted, the same
rationale might be used to eliminate adjusting the ordering costs.
Of the two, the holding rate is susceptible to the greatest error
in computation. 3inoe it is more difficult to compute, it is more
difficult to disprove an incorrect rate. Further, it is recalled
that one of the elements included in the holding cost rate is the
interest rate. The rationale which is used to increase the interest
rate, as opposed to the storage costs or the obsolescence risk rate,
follows the line that in strictly economic terms, whenever money is
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scarce, It comaands a higher rate of interest, '-/henever this rate
is increased, the new buy quantity is less than the true economic
order quantity—assuming, and this is where the trouble lies, that
the cost parameters were correctly determined in the first instance,
Graphically, the results of increasing the interest rate are
portrayed in figure 2, It can be seen that, if the cost parameters
were determined correctly in the first place, total costs in the
exsunple increased from |4,000 to about |4,400, presumably an
uneconomical expenditure of 0400. A second point to observe from
Figure 2, is that even though the reorder quantity was cut twenty
percent, because of the relatively "flat" contour of the curve
near the minimum point, total costs increased only approximately
ten percent. It can be also noted, however, that as further
adjustments of the Interest rate are made in the same direction,
total costs will increase significantly.
Possibly the most misleading part of the graph is the top
line, the apparent total annual coats line. It would appear that
even with the increased interest rate, the buy quantity computed
would result in the most economical operation—which is not true.
The "aura" of economy which is imparted to the unwary does not
In fact exist. Conversely, if the cost parameters are not computed
accurately in the first place, this same aura of scientific
analysis may be present, when in fact, true economy is not attained.
Thus, the inventory manager oan be misled into supporting a positioz:




Effects of Adjusting the Interest Rate on the Oomputation
of fioonomio Reorder Quantities
tlnnu E
1
^500 400q 500q 600 800
/^XAO = Increase in total Annual Costs by using the inorea3e<r"Yate
of interest,
Q = 3oonomio Order Quantity (500)
Ql= Buy Quantity using the increased rate of interest (400)
I = Minimuai lotal Oosts (04,000)
Tx= Total Oosts using Increased rate of interest. (|4,400)
k.
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Many attempts have been made arbitrarily to adjust cost
parameters to aohiere a portion of the desired results (I.e., a
decrease in tna level of Inventory Investment). In general, it
has been found that the results of these have been difficult to
rationalize and have not held up under analysis. In one such case
It was decided that the safety level of certain categories of
material could be reduced from the 99. 9?^ level of effectiveness
which resulted when the predetermined parameters were used. The
shortage cost (the additional costs Incurred by running out of
material) was out to one-half of the previous value. Stock levels
were then lowered without a significant lowering of effectiveness.
In another Instance, the unit ordering costs used were
significantly lower than those previously determined. This was
justified on the basis that the number of orders decreased the
operating level Investment hopefully enough to "pay for" the
Increase In operating costs whloh resulted from using the advanced
supply decision rules with the lower order costs. However, this
adjustment is at variance with what might be experienced with a
decrease in the number of orders; the unit order cost would tend
to rise. At least a part of the unit order costs are fixed and
semi-variable. Fortunately, the reduced order costs were not
introduced into the Navy supply system, A research team, working
with the problem of reducing investment levels to meet budgetary




What are the implioit assuiaptions behind the
parameters suggested . , . compared, say, to the
(original) parameters , . . ? First one can deduce
the assumption that it costs ona-flfth as muoh to
requisition (one type of) material as (another) and
ons-tiiantj-fifth as muoh as (a third type). Slnoe
this assumption cannot be supported by outside data,
one must next assume that the holding cost is five and
25 times as great for the other material. Now the
twenty percent holding cost for (one type) can be broken
down as follows—storage rate 1^, time-preference rate
14^, and obsolescence rate 5%. To increase the holding
rate for the four (types) under consideration by varying
the obsolescence rate would result in an obsolescence
rate of 85% per year for (the one), and 485^ for (the other
type). These high values seem no more reasonable than a
very lovr ordering cost for these (types).*
Also:
Comparison of shortage costs reveals the implicit
assumption that shortages in (one type of material) are
one-fifth as important, and one-tenth as important in
(another type), as in \%he third type). Studies of
essentiality of items aboard submarines suggest that
electronics items may be categorically less essential
than ships parts and ordnance items. There are, however,
no studies to indicate that uniforms and lubricants are
one-fifth as important as general stores items.
Thus, to avoid increasing investment in each of the
individual nine types of material under investigation
we have had to make implicit assumptions about order cost,
obsolescence, and essentiality whioh are neither completely
logical nor supported by known studies.
^
This lf5 also noted in a study of ordering costs at the Ships
Parts Oontrol Center, Meohanicsburg, Pennsylvania:
Another example is that with economic order quantity
rulsT the sjnount of money to be spent on stock purchases
is dependent upon the ratio of the "order oo3t" parameter
to the "holding oost" parameter, which may be more or lass
than the amount of money available. Therefore, "order
•^
^r.->Qrt of a limulation of the Use of He\ir Replenishment
Rules at ^Jayy Secondary jtook Points with Recommendations for
Installation of the P.uleg . A report prepared for the Bureau of
upplies and Accounts, Navy Department, v/ashington, D. 0. (Los




oost" and/or "holding cost" are adjusted to stay
within th9 budget and, thereby, lose any resemblaaoe
to :3i3asur9S of rssouroe utilisation (i.e., oosts).
Many other factors continually force decision-makers
to modify the rules, so that their reseablanoe to the
rules originally formulated is more apparent than
real«i
It seeras as if the authors have noted the fallacy that, in
arbitrarily adjusting the coat parameters, we have attempted to
make the circumstances fit the system rather than design a system
that vrould be responsive to the needs of management, We are
cautioned by one leading authority in this respect when he
discusses scientific management techniques per se:
In fact, we may be developing a "gadget bag" of
techniques for the efficiency expert instead of a
management science vrhich supplies knowledge, concepts,
and disciplines for the use of management ,2
Ihere have been attempts to determine the losses which would result
If incorrect data were used, Hr» Joel Levy approaches the problem
in a technical paper by "assuming" correct parameters and then
discusses the technical procedure which would be used for computing
the losses which would result if other values were used.^ fhls is
a recognition by Mr» I»evy of the difficulties involved in the
determination of the "correct" parameters. Nevertheless, it is
iDunlap and Associates, Inc., loc, cit ., p, 71.
2
Peter F. Drucker, "Thinking Ahead, " Harvard Business
Review . January-'February, 1959, p. 25-
^J. Levy, "Loss Resulting From the Use of Incorrect Data in
Oompating an Optimal Inventory Policy," rjayal Research .Lo,?.:!sties
Quart erl^y . >iarch, 1958, p. 75,
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believed that we must make our best effort to ascertain these
parameters, Onoe determined, their arbitrary adjustment to effect
a reduction in order quantities T^ill only serve to confuse and
mislead the inventory manager. It is concluded that the method
described in the subsequent section is preferable to reduce
quantities ordered. The cost parameters, as determined by proper
cost analysis, should remain as guideposts for inventory manage-
ment decisions.
Hedaotion of Boonomio Order QuantJ-^ies
The adverse effects uhioh have been experienced by
adjusting cost parameters, not the least of which is the loss of
confidence by budget analysts in the economic order quantity
formula. This resulted in the adoption by at least one inventory
manager, the Ooramanding Officer of the Ships Parts Oontrol Center,
of another approach. The concept was derived that rather than
"adjust" cost parameters, they would be computed as accurately as
possible in accordance with long-range plans and so far as
possible ifithin limitations set down by higher authority. After
the economic reorder quantities were computed, each one would be
reduced by whatever percentage was necessary for the Commanding
Officer to stay within the amount of Navy Stock Fund money




where all factors remain as originally described except that:
Qy = the reduced "buy" quantity, and
j^ ~ lambda, the percentage of the economic order quantities
for whioh funds are available.
This, in this computation, the "true" economic ordsr
quantity can be computed as reduced by the value of lambda. Ihe
increase in total costs incurred as a result of insufficient
stock fund can then be derived, fhe effects of this procedure
can be shown graphically as in Figure 3. The advantages of this
procedure lie in the fact that, once cost parameters are
determined, the increased costs of ordering reduced buy quantities
can be determined. The increased cost data might be submitted to
justify budget requirements, and with proper data to support
determination of cost parameters the inventory manager would be
in a more sound position to justify budget requests. Further to
illustrate the effects on total costs resulting from the
application of various values of lambda, the Ships Parts Control
Center, Mechaniosburg, Pennsylvania selected a sample of the
Items under their inventory management control and, by computer
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AIAO = Increased in total annual costs resulting from buying
reduced quantities. (|800)
Q = Economic Order Quantity (500)
Qy= Reduced Buy Quantity (300)
I = Minimum Total Annual Costs (|4,000)
T,r= Actual Total Annual Costs (|4,800)
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Aaalyslg o£ Posts. 3P00. MachanlQsbuxp:. Pa,
Uo datannine, in a speolflo example, the effect on
ordsring; oosts, holding ooata, and total annual oosts, these costs
were simulated for a sample of the inventory under the control of
the Ships Parts Control Center, Meohaniosburg, Pa. The method of
sample selection is shown in Appendix I, The sample selected
represents one percent of all the Items oontrollad, less the
items with no demand, sinoe these items would not be replenished.
This resulted in a total of 9^7 items for whic'i there has been
some movement; only Navy Stock Account items are included, there
being only a few Appropriation Purchases Account Items involved.
An average ordering oost of 325 and a holding cost rate of from 10
to 38 percent was used. The variation in holding oost rate
depends on the obsolescence risk rate assigned to the items
Included. The obsolescence risk rate varies from 5 to 33 percent;
the interest rate used is the Department of Defense directed rate
of 4 percent, and the storage oost percentage used was one percent.
The results of the simulation ars shorn in Table 1. In
this analysis, economic order quantities vrould be ordered for the
sample items when lambda vfas assigned a value of 1; that is, its
value vfould not affeot the computation of the quantities to be
ordered in the solution of the ii, 0. Q. formula. From Table 1,
based on the oost parameters used by^ the 3hips Parts Control




TOTAL ANITOAL 003T ANALrSI3
FOa 947 ITEM 3AMPLB OP 3P00, M30HAHI0S30HG, PA. |
IWMTORY 3UBJS0T TO S. 0, Qk
Lambda Sum of Sum of Sum of
^
Increase in
Ordering Oosts Holding Oosts Total Oosts^ Total Oosts-*-
0.1
-f290.921 1 2,909 §293,830 $235,646
0*2 145,460 5,818 151,279 93,094
0.3 96,974 8,727 105,702 47,517
0.4 72,730 11,656 84,367 26,183
0.5 58,184 14,546 72,730 14,546
0.6 48,487 17,455 65,942 7,758
0.7 41,560 20,364 61,925 3,740
0.8 36,365 23,273 59,639 1,454
0.9 32,324 26,182 58,507 323
1,0 29,092 29,092 58,184
1.1 26,447 32.001 58,449 264
1.2 24,243 34,910 59,154 969
1.3 22,378 37,819 60,193 2,014
1.4 20,780 40,729 61,509 3.324
1.5 19,394 43,638 63,033 4,843
1.6 18,182 46,547 64,730 6,545
1.7 17,113 49,457 66,570 8,386
1.8 16,162 52,366 68,528 10,344
.1.9 15,311 55,275 70,587 12,402
2.0 14,546 58,184 72.730 14,546
2.1 13,853 61,093 74,947 16,762
2.2 13,223 64,003 77,226 19,042
2.3 12,648 66,912 79,561 21,376
2,4 12,121 69,321 81,943 23,758
2.5 11,636 72,730 84,367 26,183
2.6 11,189 75,640 86,829 28,644
2.7 10,774 78,549 89,324 31,139
2.8 10,390 81,458 91,848 33,664
2.9 10,031 34,367 94,399 36,215
3.0 9,697 87,277 96,974 38,789
^Values taken to the next lower dollar; totals will not
necessarily be in agreement due to rounding off.
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these Itsms is 158,184. Presiuaably, for the satire universe, the
mininma total oosts for ordering and holding the inventory is
approximately |5,313,400, This siiai would be equally divided as
between ordering and holding ooats, sinoe by definition, total
costs are at a minimum when they are equal, lotal annual oosts,
ordering oosts and holdings oosts are shown in Table 1 for the
values of laiabda from =:0.1to =:3.0,
An interesting observation is that total annual oosta
increase at a much greater rata as the buy quantities are reduced
than they do as they are increased, Ihe analysis shows that If
order quantities are decreased by 50,^ (Lambda = 0,5) the increase
in total annual oosts is $14,546 for the sample items. On the
other hand, the inorease in annual oosts when the order quantities
are increased by 50;^ over the E, 0. Q. (Lambda s 1,5) is $4,848,
or about one-third. This difference increases at an ascending
rate the more the order quantities are adjusted. It would appear
from this, that if an error were to be made, it would be mora
advantageous from a total annual cost point of view for the error
to be made on the high side (ordering greater quantities),
Unfortunately, when the matter is discussed with the Navy Stock
^It should be recognized that holding costs for the
portion of the inventory which was not replenished is not included
and that total oosts therefore must be greater. To be more
aoourato the ^5,818,400 oost would be applicable only to those




Fund budi^at analyst, the taudenoy is to raduce the buy quantities
to oonssrva Navy Stook Fund mono/. The Implication is that,
althou;:h !IaT7 "itock Fund ©xpandituros are reduced, they are
rea^icaa only ati una expsnss of an overall total cost incrsaae*
The Ships Parts Control Center Is currently ordering ons-sixth of
their economic order quantitias (Lambda = 0»183) because of the
limited availability of Navy Stook Fund money. The Implication
from the analysis is that, wharsas the total annual oosts for
carrying; the inventory should be ^^5,818,400, based on the cost
parameters utilized, aotual total oosts for those items
replenished exceed §15, 121, 900 (based on the value Lambda =0.2
from Table 1)* This would indicate that the hand-to-mouth
operation used in managing Ships Parts Control Center *s inventory
is costing the U. 3. economy 19,309,400 more than necessary.
These oosts would be most difficult to verify from the
appropriation structure since they would be dispersed throughout
the supply system and, as noted previously, include charges that
are not in the Navy appropriation structure. The estimated amount
for purchases of Navy Stook Fund Material for 3hips Parts Control
Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa,, for the fiscal year 1963, is almost
1170,000,000,^ Part of the oosts, for example, included in the
total cost of inventory management would be the interest charge on
tne average amount held. Also, it would be inappropriate to make
mmtimmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmammtmmimm mn l —mm—mir ——Mil iiiiiin i n ««»—«—. i l
^BuSaudA, Navy Stook Fund, loo, oit ,, p, 70.
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a oomparison of the balance of the costs with appropriated amounts,
especially since the value of lambda as one-sixth (.183) has been
in effect for a part of the year only. But the bulk of the costs
of inventory management are funded by the appropriation,
Operation and Maintenance, Navy, The Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts' allocation of this appropriation for the fiscal year
1963, ^'"T^s t207»6OO,OOO. The Navy supply system manages
approximately 1,200,000 items, of '-^hloh Ships Parts Control Center,
Mechanicsburg controls about 160,000 or approximately 13^. It
would be ino'orrect to consider that the amount necessary to
support the ordering, holding, and issuing of material controlled
by Ships ?^t%q Control Center, Mechanicsburg, would require the
-annual sl^^iliditure of ^^36.4 aiillion (13^ of the O&M funds under
the control of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts) since there
are othslc functions financied by this appropriation. But it is
aejb^'uareasonable to believe that the cost of ordering and holding
the operating Jevel of supply of those items controlled by Ships
Parts Control Center exceeds the amount indicated in the total
cost analjrsis. It must be emphasized that in the computation
Ships Parts Coritrol Center, Mechanicsburg, in the case of storage
charges and interest rate used the rates prescribed by higher
authority. Their relationship to actual costs is certainly open
to q.uestion. Also, in the case of ordering costs used, the
definition- of 1*he ordering costs is arbil&rary—it considers only
those costs incurred at Ships Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg.
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The total oost average of $25 rather than a variable element of
the ordering costs of the supply system was used. '<^hat the actual
variable ordering cost should be, as contemplated for use in the
formula, is not known or substantiated by any studies to the
author's knowledge.
Navy Posts of Inventory Manai?>ement
However, despite the lack of information regarding the
specific costs, the magnitude of some of the oost elements can be
considered from a Navy viewpoint. Many of the ordering and
holding costs are merged with each other and with other costs in
the present accounting structure. However, the Servioewlde Supply
part of the appropriation. Operation and Maintenance, Navy 1963i
is approximately |297»684,000. A breakdown of the amounts
budgeted is shown in Table 2,^ Certain elements might be isolated
for applicability in this case. The Navy supply system operations
part of the appropriation (Management code OH in Table 2) is
budgeted at 1172,032,000. Inventory control point operations
(Oode OS in Table 2) Is budgeted at a cost of f^^, 787, 000. What-
ever percentage of the total effort is devoted to purchasing,
ordering* receiving, and intra-Navy shipping is properly allocable
'•The information in Table 2 is taken from a report, Serial
63-4 of 14 February 1963, prepared by the comptroller of the
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to the total coat of ordering. Ths variable elements of these
costs cannot be determined without further analysis and a ^
definition of an appropriate tiaie«franie. Other ordering costs
from Table 2 would inolude purchasing operations (Management oodeV
OS) budgeted at $2,250,000. Also, the percentage of transportation
costs (under code OD) of $39,7'o3|000 applicable to intratNavy
shipments ^ould be a cost of ordering. Data to allocate aom? of
these costs may be available from other sources. For ajfaiiiplisif,
workload data relative to the receipt and issue of material is
contained in another report as shown in Table 3. Based on ti|e
PI 1962 data from Table 3» it appears that of the total line '
items handled by the Havy supply system, approximately 22 percen*^
were receipts for stock. This is presumably a measure of the
ordering volume although It would be inappropriate to apply this
percentage to the total costs incurred, sinoe many of the costs
are unrelated to the ordering of stock material. Prom Table 3 it
can also be noted that about 25,^ of the line items handled for
Ships Parts Control Osnter controlled ships repair parts (H
cognisance items) were receipts into stock, somewhat higher than
the system average. In a report prepared for the internal
consumption of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, it is noted
for the fiscal year 1962, that while material under the control of
the Ships Parts Control Oenter, Meohanicsburs, accounted for
aboat 15 percent of the supply actions, Ships Parts Control Oenter
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actions of the supply system. Ihls would indicate that Inventory
decisions for the ship's parts segment of the supply system are
responsible for a higher percentage of the total ordering oosts
than other inventory decisions. Presumably, these decisions
should have been made in the light of this information. The
variable element of the ordering oosts incurred is not Icnown,
In connection with both ordering and holding costs,
certain other statistical data are available in the performance
progress report cited previously^ as shown in Table 4. 2he
difficulty in allocating these costs, which were collected by work
measurement function, to either ordering or holding categories can
be seen in the possible allocations attempted in column 4 of
Table 4, The further problem of determining the variable elements
involved is even more difficult.
Other data are available in the budget report submitted
by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts for the Navy 3took Fund,
For example, it appears some validity can be ascribed to the 5-33
percent otasolesoenoe risk rates used by the Ships Parts Oontrol
Center, Mechanics burg, in their cost analysis. For the fiscal
year 1963, the budget indicates approximately ^88,261,000 will be
received by the Navy Stock Fund from appropriations of oonsumers
as surcharges. In addition to this, approximately §80,146,000
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Performance Prcairess
Seport . ( Washington : BuSandA, Fiscal Year 1962), pp. 12-13.

















Storage Control $9,032 1- Holding-Storage
Storage Custody 10,294 Holding-Storage








Stook: i4gt (Control) 23,065 15,134 Varlous^g?^-^-^
Admin. Operations 19,380 10,969 Various
Traffic, Hec, 3hlp# 13»823 „ ,
^Ordering
yarious^Other
Purchase 2,250 4,404 Ordering
Other ^*unotlons b b Various
Total Obligations 1218,879 178,981
^The Infonaatl
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bs report. Performance Progress
Report, (vrashln^ton: I
report has been dlscon
rear 1962), pp. 3-5. This





will be written off as etoolc losses. ^fhlle these costs are shown
as stock losses and other Inventory adjustments, supporting
schedules indicate most of these changes are transfers to
disposal. For ships parts alone the amount which was transferred
to disposal during the fiscal year I963 was budgeted to be
044,500,000.^
With respect to interest oosts, total Navy Stock Fund
inventories of peacetime operating stook are estimated at about
|620 million.^ Ihe interest cost of holding this amount of
material in storage at the Department of Defense directed rate of
4 percent would be a significant |24.8 million. If a higher rate
of interest were considered appropriate on the basis of
alternative uses, the cost of interest would be proportionately
higher. Since any reduction in the inventory releases funds for
other uses, it is basically a variable element of cost and could
be reduced proportionately with the reduction of inventories.
Ihe extent of any savings derived by reduction of this cost will,
of course, not appear in any Navy appropriation and is,
therefore, not subject to verification.
1
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Havy Stock Fund .
Fiscal Year 1963 Reapportionment. Fiscal Year 1964 Budget
Bstimates . ('iashington: BuSandA, 1 October 1962), p. 10,
^Ibid ., p. 70.
^Ibid .. p. 10.
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Smamarizlns, the magnitude of the oosts Involved are:
Post Slement Amount (thouBanda )
Ssrvloewide Supply (O&M) $297t684




Total oosts indicated $490,891
This is not to say other costs are not involved, Mlitary Pay,
Navy, Military Construction, Navy, as well as other appropriations,
contribute a portion of the costs allocable to inventory
managdiaent decisions, but the method of allocation is so nebulous
as to almost defy analysis. The above is presented only to give
the reader some perspective as to the magnitude of the oosts
involved.
The cost data above oannot be related to the total cost
analysis of Ships Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg. But
inventory decisions in the long run should reflect the total oosts
involved. Quantitative analysis will help, especially if the
costs are segregated as in the case of the method currently in
use at Ships Parts Control Center, Meohaniosburg, The value in
using lambda in the computation of requirements is that it
points up a potential area for the reduction of oosts and for
Increasing efficiency in the management of invatories. The
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Implloation o£ the analysis Is not necessarily the conclusion.
The oonoluston is that prudent managers should be so motivated by
such a possibility that no effort is spared in determining the
cost parameters which are necessary to verify or refute the
implication. Industry has used economic lot theory for many
years Many refinements have been made, The eoonomio order
quantity formulae has been generally accepted by management in
industry as the most efficient method for those items where it is
applicable. With increasing costs and narrowing profit margins,
industry has been hard pressed to find the most economical va.y of
managing inventories, Sconomit lot production is a way of life
in our raass-produotion-oriented economy. Industry has found it
absolutely mandatory to determine cost parameters. Profitability
of products oan be determined only after all oosts are allocated*
Ooat accounting techniques have been developed so that a
reasonably accurate estimate of fixed semi-variable and variable
cost-elements are determined. These are the very same cost
parameters needed to confirm or refute the implication Navy
inventories are not managed most economically.





It is implied by the data presented in this thesis that
we may not be managing our inventories economically. It is '
concluded, based on the research necessary for this thesis, that
we simply do not Imow. Further, we cannot be sure until we Icnow ,'
what are our inventory management costs. These costs are so (
widely dispersed throughout the Navy appropriation structure and
elsewhere, that they are difficult to determine.
A second conclusion is that studies made to date to /
determine the cost parameters of Navy inventory management are, t,
at best, inadequate. Such data as have been generated, have been
summarily rejected as a basis for justifying budget requirements
by both the Department of Defense and Bureau of the Budget budget :
analysts,
A third conclusion is the fact that economic order
quantity formulae have been used for decades by industry with
Increasing effectiveness for both economic lot production and




tile most efficient method of inventory management. To do this,
it has been necessary for industry to determine its inventory
management cost parameters; in faot, through cost accounting
techniques, reasonable estimates have been determined with respeOt
to their fixed, semi-variable and variable elements. \.'\s.
t V ^^i
Finally, we in the Navy can also make these same cost \
parameter determinations; these determinations would be helpful >
for budget and management purposes, but a longer time fr^.ms of
i
'
reference must be used for long-range efficiency.
I
,11
A note of caution is inserted here; if economic order
quantity formulae are utilized, the conditions precedent to their
use must exist. They can reduce costs. They will not solve
inventory management problems except with respect to random f
variation. Misapplication of the formulae remains as a constant
danger.
Recommendations
It is recommended that a major effort be expended in the
direction of determining cost parameters applicable to the
management of those segments of the Navy Department's inventories
susceptible to replenishment by economic order quantity formulae.
It is recommended that an agreement be reached between
Navy representatives and the Department of Defense and Bureau of
the Budget analysts as to the time-frame of reference which should
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be used for the determination of the variable ele^ients of the
costs involved. As a corollary, it is reoommended the time-frame
be extended beyond the budget year on the premise that in the
long run all costs are variable. If -.fhen costs -^re revie^red there
are considered only these inputs ^./hich are variable on an annual
basis, many costs would not ever be included. As a oompromise,
it is suggested all costs over a five-year period be considered
as variable (on a progressive basis) to coincide with the current
policy of planning as practiced by the Department of Defense for
budget analyses.
Finally, it is reoommended, onoe acceptable ground rules
for cost parameter analysis have been established, and cost
parameters determined, that inventory managers utilize the
economic order quantity formulae to the extent applicable for




Samples Used for Simulation^
A, The Head for Samples .
Using the complete Perpetual Inventory Record (PIR),
approximately ISI^OOO items, in a simulator is not economically
feasihle. To run the complete PIR through Simulation would
require approximately 22 hours of machine time, while a 10^
sample of the PIR would require approximately 2 hours, and a 1^
ssunple 12 minutes. Hence economy demands that sampling be used.
B, Sampling Scheme .
There are numerous ways to select a sample: select
every 10th item on the stock list, or every item ending in 67 or
97. Any scheme is valid if it produces a sample which is
representative of the universe.
Thus the essential quality of a sample is its
representativeness, and with our heterogeneous stock list this
presents problems, particularly if the simulator produces output
Advanced Logistic Research and Development Branch, Ships
Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa., A Single Warehouse
System Simulator. Simulator Beta . (Ships Parts Control Center,




heretofore unavailable, and therefore not subject to comparison
with knowni characteristics of the universe.
^presentativeness of a sample may be determined by the
ratios of the sample to the universe in the number of F items,
S items, distribution of Q, unit price, etc. But how oan it be
determined that a sample is representative of the stock list if
it used in a simulator to produce output for which no criteria for
comparison exists: output such as average risk and BOQ, number
of buys and dollars required for stock replenishment.
If this is the situation then the determination of
representativeness must be made indirectly rather than through a
direct ratio comparison. Several samples are selected randomly
and run through the simulator. Then an analysis is made of the
simulator output to see if all the samples maintain a reasonable
consistency in all results. This being true, the assumption is
made that any or all the samples are representative of the stock
list.
To perform this analysis four 10/S samples were selected
in the following manner:
Sample
1. AA 1st and every subsequent 10th item.
2. BB 3rd and every subsequent 10th item.
3. 00 5th and every subsequent 10th item.
4. DD 8th and every subsequent 10th item.




1. A 1st and every subsequent 100th item.
2. B 25th and every subsequent 100th item.
3. 50th and every subsequent 100th item.
4. D 75th and every subsequent 100th item.
These eight samples v^ere selected from the PIR as of
week 02, the first review of PI 1962 after the PIE update and
before the Supply Demand Review of week 02,
0. Sample Determination .
The four 10^ samples were analyzed for consistency
of results, and proved to be satisfactory, having an average
overall error in results of 4.8^.
The average error was obtained in the following manner:
The average risk of each sample is




DD 17 r 553, .124
70.701 .249
Mean = ZO^IOl ^ 17.675
24QMean Average Deviation = ^ 7^ = ,06225
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To convert the mean absolute deviation into an expression
which indicates the average peroentage error, divide the mean
average deviation (MA.DO by the mean (X)
:
Shis average peroentage error is eq.uivaXent to the MA.D expressed
as a percent of the mean«
She t/pe of analysis was performed on several facets of
simulator output, resulting in the following average peroentage
errors between sample results:
Output Peroentage ^ror
Average System Risk .355^
Dollar Forecast 1 •11%
Number of Buys Forecast 2,39^
Number Q*s (Quarterly Mean Average) a .9^%
Average Sconomic Order Quantity 4.085^
Number ^'s 1.5 7.53^
Number Q*s 1,5 6,90^
lotal Q 8.94^
38,32^
Then an average was taken of the peroentage errors, which
^s 38,32 or 4»8^. This means that on the average the MAD was
8
approximately 5% of the mean, whloh is believed to be a
reasonable error over samples taken from suoh a heterogeneous
universe as the Ships Parts Control Oenter PIH.
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The 1% samples produoed output of such wide varianoe that
three of the four samples had to be discarded. Only Sample A
gave results whioh were reasonably olose to the 10^ samples*
Finally Sample A, the only usable 1% sample, and Sample
AA vera retained for simulation*
Sample AA was retained beoause, of the four 10^ samples,
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